We consider a seller who owns two capacity constrained resources and markets two products (components) corresponding to these resources as well as a bundle comprising the two components. In an environment where all customers agree that one of the two components is of higher quality than the other and that the bundle is of the highest quality, we derive the seller's optimal bundling strategy. We demonstrate that the optimal solution depends on the absolute and relative availabilities of the two resources as well as upon the extent of subadditivity of the quality of the products. The possible strategies that can arise as equilibrium behavior include a pure components strategy, a partial or a full spectrum mixed bundling strategy, and a pure bundling strategy, where the latter strategy is optimal when capacities are unconstrained. These conclusions are contrary to findings in the prior literature on bundling which demonstrated the unambiguous dominance of the full spectrum mixed bundling strategy.
Introduction
Simon Property Group (SPG), 1 the largest shopping-mall owner in the US, leases mall space to retailers. Its portfolio of properties includes premium malls such as the Copley Place in the exclusive BackBay area of Boston, MA as well as normal malls in the same market such as the Arsenal Mall just a few miles away. Premium malls are situated in more attractive and more accessible locations; they also attract shoppers with higher disposable incomes compared to normal malls. As a consequence, mall retailers consider premium-mall space to be more valuable than normal-mall space. However, a retailer's ability to generate higher revenues at premium malls varies greatly depending on the products it sells. For instance, Johnston and Murphy (J&M), and Aldo both sell men's shoes and accessories at both types of malls. However, J&M, appealing to the well-heeled professional, derives greater value from a premium mall store than does Aldo. Similarly, premium-mall locations generate greater value for Tiffany and Co.
and Williams-Sonoma as compared to Zales Jewelers and the Kitchen Collection. Given this variability in the retailer valuations, SPG can more successfully extract rents from retailers by designing a product line that facilitates enhanced segmentation of the population of retailers. Specifically, in addition to offering separate store leases in each mall type (premium or normal), it can also offer at a discounted price a bundle (Stigler, 1963) consisting of two stores, one from each type of mall. 2 With bundling as an option, a seller (e.g., the mall owner) can choose between a: (i) pure components strategy, that is, offer the products (components) only as separate items; (ii) pure bundling strategy, that is, offer only the package of the two components; and (iii) mixed bundling strategy, that is, offer both the bundle and the components. Mixed bundling offers the opportunity to more precisely segment the market, and previous literature has shown (Schmalensee, 1984 ) that this strategy (weakly) dominates the 1 http://www.simon.com/about_simon/index.aspx 2 As evidence of bundling in this sector, consider the February 17, 2010 article about SPG's bid to acquire General Growth in which the Wall Street Journal reported "[SPG's] size would mean that retail chains such as Gap Inc. and AnnTaylor Corp. would have only one landlord to deal with when negotiating leases and opening stores at many high-end malls. A mall owner with hundreds of properties can pressure retailers into opening stores in struggling locations as a condition of getting space at its choicest sites." other two strategies. However, in practice, we see marketers using all three strategies. This paper examines this heterogeneity in the use of bundling by deriving optimal revenue-maximizing strategies for sellers such as SPG, who offer vertically differentiated products in a limited capacity environment.
Mall retailers consider a premium mall store to be more attractive than a normal mall store, and a bundle of both stores to be more attractive than the premium product by itself. Thus, given suitably low prices, all buyers prefer the normal product to no product, the premium product to the normal product, and the bundle to the premium product. This vertical differentiation exists in many other markets as well.
In television advertising, advertisers consider prime-time to be more valuable than non-prime time since it traditionally attracts a higher number of viewers. As another example, IDS (of the Li and Fung group)
operates pharmaceutical manufacturing plants in both Malaysia and Thailand. 3 Companies buy manufacturing capacity from IDS, and value capacity in Malaysia more highly than in Thailand due to better overall infrastructure 4 and better corporate governance (McGee, 2008) . Obviously, in these situations, the bundle provides the highest value. The extant bundling literature has not studied this type of preference ordering, arising due to differing quality ratings, among the products.
The resource availability in settings such as shopping mall and contract manufacturing is limited.
Likewise, in television advertising published data suggests that competitive pressures implicitly limit the commercial time networks use: The non-programming minutes per hour are 16:32, 16:36, 16 :46, and 16:57 for Fox, CBS, NBC, and ABC respectively. 5 Based on these observations, we assume that the resource availabilities are limited, and investigate how the seller's decisions change with capacity. None of the previous bundling literature has modeled either vertical differentiation or resource availabilities.
The relationship among the quality ratings of the products is another important factor that distinguishes our work from previous bundling literature. For example, the number of unique shoppers visiting Gap at a bundle of premium and normal mall locations in a particular trade area is likely to be lower than the sum of unique shoppers at each of the two stores if it were to open one without the other.
In other words, the quality ratings have a subadditive relationship in the shopping mall application. As we argue later, other situations may have a superadditive quality relationship; we study how the nature of this relationship further affects the seller's optimal bundling strategy.
Certain characteristics of our problem (e.g., perishable resources, fixed capacities) suggest an overlap with the revenue management literature (see the comprehensive book by Talluri and van Ryzin (2004) and the survey by Bitran and Caldentey (2003) ). However, our study differs significantly from traditional revenue management work in terms of the contextually-specified relationship between the quality ratings of the products, the basis for market segmentation, and the research focus. For example, previous revenue management literature focused primarily on travel related industries (airline, lodging, cruise, or car rental) where horizontal, not vertical, differentiation is prevalent. Even in other industries such as television advertising, the revenue management research focus is on optimizing advance sales (Bollapragada and Mallik, 2008) or capacity allocation between advance and spot markets (Araman and Popescu, 2010), rather than on modeling the vertically differentiated market. Furthermore, in this literature, customers are segmented a priori according to demographical or observed/forecasted behavioral traits (e.g. business/leisure travelers), and companies implement "fences" (e.g., a Saturday night stay a student id requirement) in order to prevent spillage between segments. Our approach, on the other hand, uses a self-selection mechanism for (second degree) price discrimination.
Our analysis combines vertically differentiated products and limited resource availability to obtain several novel and insightful results. First, when the quality ratings are subadditive, we show that as observed in practice, a full range of segmentation strategies can be optimal. This is contrary to past bundling literature which shows that the mixed bundling strategy (weakly) dominates the pure components and the pure bundling strategies. Interestingly, the tightness and the relative tightness of the available resources play a pivotal role in determining the optimal strategy. With superadditive quality ratings, the optimal set of strategies still depends on the resource availability but no longer spans full market segmentation or pure components. When capacities are unconstrained the optimal strategy is always pure bundling. Thus, the clean, unambiguous structure of the optimality of mixed bundling breaks down when the products are vertically differentiated and resources are limited. Second, whereas the earlier literature tied the benefit from mixed bundling primarily to the extent of heterogeneity in consumer preferences (Schmalensee, 1984) we demonstrate that the skewness of the distribution of preferences is also important. Third, we underscore how the degree of the subadditivity in the ratings affects the optimal strategy, showing that increased subadditivity increases the propensity to use the mixed bundling and the pure component strategies-this result is antithetical to our a priori intuition which suggests that increased subadditivity would lead to enhanced use of only the pure components strategy. Finally, to model the situation where quality ratings depend on the market segment, we develop and analyze a model with added horizontal differentiation. We demonstrate that increased horizontal product differentiation has an effect that is similar to reduced subadditivity of the ratings of the vertically differentiated components.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses our modeling assumptions and develops a nonlinear pricing model. In Section 3, we analyze the optimal solution properties assuming a uniform distribution of the buyer's efficiency. Section 4 studies the impact of horizontal differentiation. Section 5
shows that our conclusions are quite robust and hold for other distributions as well. Section 6 concludes the paper by identifying some future research directions.
The Model
A monopolist shopping mall owner or a monopolist television broadcasting network, 6 both of whom we refer to generically as the seller, considers offering for sale her 7 available resources, which are 6 If SPG's acquisition of General Growth is successful, it would own more than a third of all malls and more than half of all premium malls (The Wall Street Journal, February 17, 2010, Simon Offers $10 Billion for General Growth). Coupled with high entry barriers in the shopping mall industry, this fact suggests that SPG is a virtual monopoly at least in some regions. Similarly, some television broadcasting market segments (channels), such as sports (ESPN), music (MTV), comedy (CC), and cooking (FOOD), exhibit a virtual monopolistic environment. 7 Where necessary, we use feminine gender for the seller and masculine gender for the buyer.
of two types: normal and premium. The availability of both resources is fixed, with q N (q P ) denoting the amount of normal (premium) resources available. The seller's objective is to maximize her total revenue.
As in Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) , we assume that the variable costs of both resources are zero. 8 The seller considers three products: the normal and the premium products consisting of one unit of the corresponding resources, and a bundle consisting of one unit of each of the two resources. These items can be advertising time during nonprime time (normal) and prime time (premium) segments, or retail stores in normal and premium malls.
The market consists of buyers interested in purchasing these three products. In line with the bundling literature (Adams and Yellen, 1976; Schmalensee, 1984) , we assume that the marginal utility of a second unit of capacity of a given type is zero for all buyers. 9 Buyers have a strict ordering of their preferences: They prefer purchasing (i) a bundle to a premium product, (ii) a premium product to a normal product, and (iii) a normal product to refraining from purchasing altogether. We designate the quality ratings of the normal, premium, and the bundle options by α, β, and γ, respectively, where, 0 < α < β < γ.
Let  = (γ  β) /  denote the quality relationship parameter. We consider both  < 1 and  ≥ 1, representing respectively a subadditive and a superadditive relationship in the quality ratings. We say that ratings subadditivity increases (decreases) when  decreases (increases). The premium and the normal shopping mall would attract shoppers from the same trade area and so the quality ratings exhibit a subadditive relationship. Similarly, Goettler (1999) , and Brown and Cavazos (2003) observe empirically a subadditive relationship in an advertising setting where multiple showings of a television commercial increase the number of unique viewers less than proportionally. Jones' (1997) empirical analysis also 8 When the components are independently valued and resource availability is unlimited, unit costs have been considered earlier in the literature by McAfee et al. (1989) , among others. Their results show that mixed bundling is the (weakly) dominant strategy, in contrast to the full range of optimal strategies that we obtain. We conjecture that for the situation we are modeling, unit component costs do not affect the general thrust of our findings. 9 Keeping this assumption invariant while introducing vertical differentiation and limited resource capacities allows us to isolate the effect of these two aspects on the seller's marketing strategy, and contrast our findings with those in the existing literature. For a relaxation of this assumption, see Hitt and Chen (2005) Buyers differ in their willingness to pay for the three product variants. For example, a retailer such as Abercrombie and Fitch may be more willing to lease a store in a premium mall than Dress Barn.
While both retailers value the larger volume and higher disposable income of potential customers at a premium mall, Abercrombie and Fitch benefits to a greater extent since premium mall customers tend typically to be more brand conscious. We designate by the parameter t the intrinsic efficiency of a buyer to generate value from his customers, and assume that this efficiency is continuously distributed on the unit interval according to some (differentiable) probability density function f(t) and cumulative distribution function F(t). The willingness to pay of a buyer with efficiency t for product variant i is thus equal to t r i , where r i is the quality rating of the i th product variant. These variants are the seller's normal (N), premium (P), and bundle (B) options.
Given this distribution of intrinsic efficiency and the willingness to pay function, the seller's optimal strategy induces the buyers to self-select into at most four segments as described in Figure 1 , with the thresholds T*, T**, and T*** demarcating the different market segments. 10 With this strategy, buyers in the highest range of intrinsic efficiencies (interval [T*, 1]) choose to purchase the bundle. Those in the second highest range (interval [T**, T*)) choose the premium product, those in the third highest range (interval [T***, T**)) choose the normal product, and those in the lowest range refrain from purchasing
altogether. An interval of zero length implies that the seller does not find it optimal to offer the corresponding product. The values of the threshold parameters T*, T**, and T*** are determined to guarantee that the buyer located at a given threshold level is indifferent between the products corresponding to the two adjacent intervals separated by this threshold parameter.
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To set up the model we define the selling prices for the bundle, premium, and normal products by p B , p P and p N , respectively. The seller's revenue optimization model with mixed bundling, ROMB, is:
subject to:
1  F(T**) ≤ q P , and
The seller's revenue from a market segment equals its size multiplied by the price of the corresponding product; the total revenue, , in (1) is the sum of the revenues from the three market segments. Constraint (2), the "price-arbitrage" constraint, prevents arbitrage opportunities for a buyer to compose a bundle by buying the premium and the normal products separately. 11 Constraints (3) and (4) are capacity constraints for the premium and normal resources.
Buyers self-select their purchases (or decide against purchasing any product) based on their willingness to pay and the product prices. (See Moorthy (1984) for an analysis of self-selection based market segmentation.) We refer to the difference between a buyer's willingness to pay and the price of the product he purchases as the net benefit that the buyer derives from the purchase. A buyer will purchase a product only if his net benefit is nonnegative. Moreover, a buyer will be indifferent, say, between buying the premium product and buying a bundle if he extracts the same net benefit from either purchase. The following relationships (5) between the net benefits are invariant boundary conditions, regardless of the efficiency distribution f(t): Before we analyze the situations that arise when at least one of the capacity constraints is binding, Proposition 1 considers the case when neither capacity constraint is binding. Let
the hazard rate function. The Appendix gives the technicalities of this and all subsequent results.
Proposition 1. If the premium and normal resource availability is sufficiently high, th(t) is a monotonically increasing function of t on the domain [0, 1], and h(1) > 1, the optimal strategy for the seller is pure bundling. The corresponding optimal threshold is the fixed point of the reciprocal of the hazard rate function of the distribution of buyers, that is, T* = [1  F(T*)] / f(T*).
The following corollary uses Markov's inequality to establish an upper bound on the optimal revenue when the resource availability is unconstrained. Schmalensee, 1984) which demonstrates that the mixed bundling strategy weakly dominates both the pure bundling and pure components strategies. This apparent contradiction can be explained by the fact that markets are vertically differentiated in our context. In contrast, previous research does not assume such an ordering. Since every buyer finds the bundle to be the most desirable option, the seller offers only the bundle when the available premium and normal resources are unconstrained. As mentioned previously, the unconstrained case is unlikely to arise in the context of our motivating examples. Broadcasters are constrained by the advertising time resource and mall operators are similarly capacity constrained.
Corollary 2. An upper bound on the seller's total revenue
In the next section we derive the analytical solution of the constrained optimization problem under the simplifying assumption that the efficiency parameter of buyers is uniformly distributed. In Section 5, we extend the results numerically using a Beta distribution.
Revenue Maximizing Strategies when Capacity is Binding
Clearly, the capacity constraints in the ROMB model play a significant role in determining the seller's optimal strategy. Particularly, the relative scarcity of the two resources, premium and normal, is the main driver of the analysis. For the shopping mall and the television advertising settings, the premium resource availability constraint (3) is more likely to be binding than the normal resource availability constraint (4) due to infrastructural and competitive reasons, respectively. This is not necessarily true for applications such as the IDS one, where the normal resource availability constraint could be binding if better incentives were provided by the Malaysian authorities for building capacity. In this section, we identify the impact of the capacity constraints on the seller's optimal strategy when the distribution of the efficiencies is uniform. We find that the following strategies can arise as the optimal solution of ROMB: the bundle is not offered, that is, the pure components strategy, PC; only the bundle is offered, that is, the pure bundling strategy, PB; the bundle, as well as each separate product is offered, that is, the full spectrum mixed bundling strategy, MBPN; the bundle and the premium product are offered, that is, the partial spectrum mixed bundling strategy, MBP; the bundle and the normal product are offered, that is, the partial spectrum mixed bundling strategy, MBN.
In our derivations, we will demonstrate that the optimal strategy critically depends upon the relative availability of q P and q N . To capture this, we define the capacity mismatch (i. e, resource
(This non-intuitive form of the capacity mismatch parameter will become apparent in the sequel.) When  exceeds one, q N is scarce relative to q P and the opposite is true when  is less than one. The parameter  equals 1 when both capacities are equal. We will show, for instance, that the MBN (MBP) strategy is optimal when  is sufficiently less (greater) than 1. The MBPN strategy is optimal when the relationship among the quality ratings is subadditive and  is close to one, and q N and q P are both sufficiently large. We will also show that the characterization of the solution when the partial spectrum mixed bundling strategies (MBP or MBN) are optimal is further contingent upon the overall availability of the more abundant resource. Specifically, even though the strategy itself, say MBP, remains the same, the solution characteristics (e.g., the product prices) depend on whether q P is less than or greater than a threshold value. To distinguish between these two cases, we designate by MBP + and MBP  the partial spectrum mixed bundling strategies when q P is greater than and when q P is less than the threshold value, respectively. The threshold value depends on the efficiency distribution and, for example, equals 1/2 for the uniform distribution. We define the subcategories MBN + and MBN  of MBN in a similar manner depending on q N . Figure 2a depicts the regions corresponding to the various strategies when the relationship between the quality ratings is subadditive, and Figure 2b depicts these regions when superadditivity characterizes the ratings relationship. For the uniform distribution, the unconstrained solution that we described in Section 2 arises when q P and q N are both at least a half. In this case, at the optimal solution, the seller never sells more than an aggregate quantity of one, split equally between the premium and normal product variants. To depict the constrained solution, therefore, in Figure 2 , we restrict attention only to the case when q P + q N  1. The unconstrained solution in the figure is designated by the point, PB, where q P = q N = 1/2. We will explain in detail the boundaries for the regions in Figure 2 .
PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
The model ROMB specializes to ROMB_U for the uniform distribution case.
[ROMB_U] max 1
Clearly, the optimal strategy with unlimited resource availabilities (that is, when q P and q N ≥ 1/2) is pure bundling. When the quality ratings are subadditive, this strategy is implemented with the prices p B = /2, p P = /2, and p N = /2. With superadditive quality ratings, the prices p B = /2, p P = /2, and p N = ( )/2 support pure bundling. These prices imply T* = T** = T*** = 1/2, and the seller's revenues are /4. Note that both these solutions also guarantee that the arbitrage constraint (7) is satisfied.
We now discuss the capacity constrained case in Proposition 3a (for subadditive ratings) and 3b
(for superadditive ratings). We define the propensity to use a particular strategy as the area in the space of q P and q N values (see Figure 2 ) for which the strategy is applicable.
Proposition 3a.
When the relationship in the quality ratings is subadditive (i.e., when  < 1), 
The MBPN and the PC strategies are never optimal. The PB strategy is optimal when  = 1.
(ii)
The optimal strategy does not depend on the quality relationship parameter,  According to Part (i) of Proposition 3a, all the different bundling strategies can be optimal when the quality ratings are subadditive. Indeed, these strategies arise actually in practice. For example, the American Bankers Association uses a full spectrum mixed bundling strategy, allowing advertisers to place advertisements in its magazines individually, or in a collection of its magazines (for a discount). 12 For the partial spectrum mixed bundling case, consider the popular video game console, Nintendo Wii.
During the 2008 holiday season, many online retailers were not willing to sell the Wii (which was in short supply) by itself; they were offering it only as part of a bundle with Wii accessories, or the accessories by themselves. On the other hand, an established artist might use a pure components strategy by offering for sale only separate paintings (or sculptures). In this case, given the unique nature of these creations (and thus their scarcity), independent sale derives more value than does bundling. Finally, the Carnegie Museums of Pittsburgh is an umbrella organization for four different museums in Pittsburgh: Carnegie Museum of Art, Carnegie Museum of Natural History, The Andy Warhol Museum, and Carnegie Science
Center. However, membership to individual museums is not sold, and standard benefits 13 of becoming a member of the Carnegie Museums of Pittsburgh include the membership of each of the four museumsan example of the use of pure bundling when the resource availability is unlimited. As another example with uncapacitated resources, cable companies only offer pure bundles of channels, and do not allow subscribers to order channels on an à la carte basis. when the discrepancy between q N and q P is relatively small (Part (iii) of Proposition 3a).
When the availability of the normal resource is much greater than that of the premium resource ( <  when  <1 and q N > q P when  ≥1), the seller offers a choice between the normal product and the bundle. Conversely, when the availability of the premium resource is much greater than that of the normal resource (1/ <  when  <1 and q P > q N when  ≥1), the seller offers the premium product and the bundle. With significant abundance of one resource relative to the other, it pays to utilize the entire capacity of the more scarce resource as part of the bundle since buyers have a higher willingness to pay for the bundle than for the separate components. Any remaining quantity of the more abundant resource, not sold as part of the bundle, is offered separately to the customers. According to part (v) of Proposition 3a, pure bundling arises only when the capacity of each resource is large enough to obtain the unconstrained model solution (equal to 1/2).
Unlike the subadditive case, the PC and MBPN strategies are never optimal when the ratings are superadditive, (Part (i) of Proposition 3b). The reason for this difference is that, with superadditivity the bundle rating at least equals the sum of the ratings of its components, thus strongly incentivizing the seller to offer the bundle to the fullest extent permitted by the resource availability. Consequently, the optimal strategy is independent of the quality relationship parameter  (as long as it is at least one), and the seller implements the first best outcome of pure bundling only when both capacities are equal ( = 1). When a discrepancy in the capacities does exist, the seller utilizes the entire available capacity of the scarcer resource as a part of the bundle, and sells the leftover units of the more abundant resource as an independent component. With superadditivity and the consequent incentive to offer the largest feasible quantity of the bundle, the partial mixed bundling strategy is preferred to the MBPN strategy as it is closer to the pure bundling strategy.
Notice that the scarcity of the two resources, expressed in terms of (1/2  q N ) and (1/2  q P ), determines the regions in Figure 2a . These expressions measure the extent to which the individual capacities fall short of the unconstrained optimal value of 1/2, motivating also our definition of the capacity mismatch parameter .
Having studied how the interaction between q P and q N ,  and impacts the optimality of the different regimes, we now investigate the optimal pricing structure under the different strategies.     ; 1 ; and 1 .
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(ii) The price arbitrage constraint is not binding in the PC and the MBPN regions when the ratings are subadditive, but is always binding when the ratings are superadditive.
The proof of part (i) (see Appendix) follows by using the KKT conditions. The Appendix also provides the optimal product prices for the partial spectrum mixed bundling strategies. Note that with subadditive quality ratings the arbitrage constraint (7) (v) Increasing subadditivity of the ratings has an ambiguous effect on the product prices.
Part (i) of Corollary 5 allows us to evaluate how the MBPN solution deviates from the "first-best" outcome that we obtain in the unconstrained capacity model. Recall that in this case it is optimal to offer only the bundle at a volume equal to 1/2. In contrast, for the constrained problem, the quantity of the bundle sold is 1  T* = 1/2  (1  q P  q N )/( + 1). While the bundle is the only product sold in the unconstrained case, the proportion of buyers that purchase the bundle is less than one in the constrained case. The share of the bundle depends obviously upon the absolute degree of the scarcity (i. e., Interestingly, an increase in either the premium or the normal resource availability lowers the optimal prices of all three products even though the seller offers a lower amount of the premium product when q N increases and of the normal product when q P increases. However, the impact of higher quality on the product prices is ambiguous. 
To understand the relationship between these shadow prices and the product prices, note that the availability of one additional unit of a scarce resource results in both a direct effect of generating additional revenues from the sale of this unit (partly separately and partly in the bundle), and an indirect effect of depressing the prices that the seller can charge for the products. Specifically, since a marginal increase in the premium resource is allocated to the bundle at the rate of 1/(+ 1) and is sold separately at the rate of /(+), an additional unit of the premium resource generates direct extra revenues equal to p B /(+ 1) + (p P /(+). The extra unit depresses p B at the rate of   (1  )/( + 1) (Proposition 4).
Similarly, p P is depressed at the rate of /(), and p N at the rate of  /( + ). Combining these two effects yields the desired expression for  P , and similarly for  N . Interestingly, the shadow prices are also dependent on the extent of subadditivity . Specifically, decreased subadditivity is associated with an increase in the valuation of both the premium and the normal resource.
Shadow prices measure the extra effort the seller might be willing to incur in order to obtain an additional unit of a scarce resource. In the case of television advertising, an increase in the available advertising time comes at the expense of programming time and thus can potentially decrease the ratings and hence the advertiser's profits (Wilbur, 2008) . Similarly, expanding the retail space could have an adverse affect on the traffic congestion and parking space, and therefore decrease the number of shoppers.
The shadow prices in Proposition 6 provide an upper bound on the reduction in quality ratings that a seller might be willing to tolerate in order to increase available resources by one unit.
We can use our results to evaluate how much more valuable an additional unit of the premium resource is vis-à-vis an additional unit of the normal resource, and how this added valuation changes as we move from one regime to another. The shadow price of the premium resource is higher than that of the normal resource since the seller can charge higher prices for the premium product. This higher price is proportional to the difference in the ratings, (  ) under the PC and MBPN regimes. Interestingly, the added market segmentation facilitated under MBPN does not enhance the relative shadow price of the premium resource. The reason for this result is that an additional unit of either resource is allocated in the same proportion to the bundle, thus maintaining the relative desirability of the two resources. Under the MBN + regime, the difference  P   N is proportional to (  ) since this regime occurs under the extreme scarcity of the premium resource, and each additional unit of the premium resource is used only in the bundle, thus yielding the extra rating of  rather than . A similar allocation of an extra premium unit is optimal under MBN  also.
However, since there are no unused units of the normal resource under this regime, each additional unit of the bundle that is sold requires directing a normal product from being sold as an independent component.
Consequently,  P under MBN
 is not as high as it is under MBN + . Under MBN  , the difference  P   N is an increasing function of q N , or alternatively, since q P is fixed for this analysis, an increasing function of , until it reaches its maximum value when q N = 1/2, and the MBN + region is reached. Note also that a larger q P reduces the difference  P   N for all regimes. Hence, as the prime time becomes less scarce, its importance relative to the non-prime time resource declines.
In practice, we often see that companies are willing to pay a much higher price for increasing the capacity of the premium resource. Recently, in Pittsburgh, 14 it came to light that one of the largest billboard providers had allegedly given gifts to a city employee (who, as a consequence, was forced to resign for questionable ethics) to get him to sanction the construction of a downtown (premium location) digital billboard. (The billboard provider already had billboards in less populated Pittsburgh locations.)
Similarly, magazine publishers incur a higher cost to create a fold-out inside cover or back page advertisement (premium space) versus simply adding an additional page in the magazine.
Horizontal Differentiation Among the Components
We now consider situations where due to horizontal differentiation some buyers derive additional benefits from particular products. For instance, advertisers may value both the number of viewers and their composition. Hence, even though prime-time attracts a greater number of viewers, some advertisers appreciate the profile of viewers during non-prime time (for example, retired professionals) due to the specific appeal of their products. Similarly, while all retailers may benefit from the higher shopper traffic at premium malls, some retailers may derive extra benefits by leasing a store in a normal mall if their products are more likely to appeal to the shoppers patronizing that mall.
To incorporate this possibility, we assume that the population of buyers is divided into two segments. One segment, which we denote by type P, derives special idiosyncratic benefits from buying the premium variant of the product, and the other segment, denoted by type N, derives special benefits from buying the normal product. We model this possibility by assuming that for the former segment the quality ratings of the normal and premium variants are  and  + , respectively, and for the latter segment they are  +  and for some  > 0. Hence the added rating  is a measure of the degree of horizontal differentiation between the two product variants. We assume that purchasing a bundle consisting of both product variants yields the quality ratings +  for both market segments. Since the bundle contains each product variant, it incorporates the idiosyncratic benefit for each type of buyer.  PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE Figure 4 depicts the quality ratings for each segment of buyers and distinguishes between two cases. Case 1 implies a relatively moderate degree of horizontal differentiation, so that the rating of the premium variant continues to be higher than that for the normal variant even for type N buyers (i.e.,  >  + ). In contrast, Case 2 applies when the degree of horizontal differentiation is high and the ranking of the two variants reverses for type N buyers. It is noteworthy that in the latter case not all three segments of buyers that are depicted in Figure 4 can survive. Specifically, if at the equilibrium p P > p N , type N buyers would not buy the premium variant as a stand-alone component since they are asked to pay a higher price for a product with a lower rating. In contrast, if at the equilibrium p N > p P , no type P buyer would purchase the normal product since it is more expensive and less valuable to this buyer type. In Case 1, however, all three segments for both types of buyers can survive in the MBPN region.
It is easy to show that the solution to the unconstrained optimization problem is still pure bundling even with the additional dimension of horizontal differentiation. In Proposition 7, we characterize the MBPN equilibrium when both resource capacity constraints are binding, assuming that 
Part (i) of Proposition 7 implies that as the extent of the horizontal product differentiation increases, the size of the region supporting the MBPN regime shrinks. Relating this outcome to our earlier discussion, it appears that introducing an element of horizontal differentiation (while preserving the product ranking)
has an effect that is equivalent to reducing the extent of ratings subadditivity (that is, increasing the quality relationship parameter, ). Consequently, the ability of the seller to fully segment the population of the buyers decreases. Figure 5 illustrates this property with the arrows indicating how increasing horizontal differentiation changes the MBPN region. 15 The analysis for Case 2 (that is, when   ) leads to fairly long and complex expressions corresponding to the ones in Proposition 7 (and so we do not present them here). The complexity arises because of two reasons. First, a reversal in the product ranking occurs for Type N buyers resulting in asymmetric user preferences (and thus a shift from the vertically differentiated market structure). Second, as mentioned earlier, either Type P buyers do not buy the normal product or Type N buyers do not buy the premium product depending on the product prices. It is noteworthy that our assumption that the bundle always fully incorporates the idiosyncratic benefits derived by buyers may not always be valid. A luxury fashion house such as Louis Vuitton may actually lose some of its cachet as an exclusive retailer by leasing a store in a normal mall. On the other hand, a premium mall location may have a detrimental effect on Claire's image of a store that sells affordable costume jewelry, and thus on its appeal to its core base of tween and teenage girls. In these two examples, the bundle rating may increase by less than . Moreover, it is even possible that such retailers value leasing a store in their preferred mall to leasing stores in both malls (because  +  >  +  1
for Louis Vuitton and +  >  +  2 for Claire's, where  +  1 and  +  2 are the respective modified ratings of the bundle). With such significant levels of horizontal differentiation, the segmentation of buyers depicted in Figure 4 becomes much more difficult. 16 
Extension: General Density Functions
We now check the sensitivity of our results to changes in the density function of the efficiency random variable. To do so, we use the family of (standard) Beta distributions because it has the domain [0, 1] which equals our assumed efficiency range, and changing the parameter values generates the different shapes that are interesting from our perspective. The Beta distribution has two shape parameters, which we denote by a and b. Figure 5 gives the parametric settings and the four different shapes that we will investigate. Given the complexity of deriving the analytic solution for these more general density functions, we complement our analytical results with numerical computations. We assume that  = 1,  = 2, and  = 2.5 in order to focus on a subadditive relationship in the quality ratings.
Since  = 1 and  = 2,  must lie in the open interval (2, 3) and so a value of 2.5 for  denotes "medium"
incentive to bundle, thus not favoring either a PB or a PC strategy.
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We refer to the buyers having the efficiency distribution in Figure 6 (a) as parsimonious buyers because a large majority of them have a low willingness to pay. Similarly, we refer to buyers in Figures 6 (b), 6 (c), and 6 (d) as centric buyers, uniform buyers and high-spenders respectively (we have shown the uniform distribution in this figure for consistency with our later figures). Figure 7 presents the seller's optimal strategies (determined numerically) for each of the four different buyer types as the availability of the two resources changes. Even though there are differences across the different distribution types that reflect the distributions' unique characteristics, the general structure of the optimal strategies is similar.
Comparing the parsimonious buyers and the high-spenders cases (Figures 7 (a) and 7 (d)) we 16 An alternate way of modeling horizontal differentiation is to use a multiplicative model for incorporating horizontal differentiation. In this case, for > 1, the quality ratings for a type P (type N) buyer are , , and  (, , and ) for the normal, premium and bundle products respectively.
observe that the PC region is smaller for parsimonious buyers. The reason for this difference is that parsimonious buyers are concentrated near the low end of the efficiency scale. In order to extract greater revenue from them, the seller offers full spectrum mixed bundling even when both resource availabilities are low (and the relative availabilities are about the same). For the high-spenders case, the seller uses the PC strategy for a greater range of resource availabilities because quality ratings are subadditive.
As we mentioned earlier for the uniform buyers case, unconstrained optimization corresponds to both q N and q P values being at least a half. For the parsimonious buyers case, we can use Proposition 1 to
show that the unconstrained region begins at q N = q P = 4/9. Figure 7 (a) reflects this observation. For the high-spenders case, again using Proposition 1, we can show that the unconstrained region begins at q N = q P = 2/3. Just like for the uniform buyer case, these values of 4/9 and 2/3 do not seem to depend on the value of . Thus, the pure bundle is not offered for the high-spenders case when the sum of the resource availabilities is at most one, as we have assumed in this paper. Schmalensee (1984) has previously observed that mixed bundling reduces the heterogeneity in the customers, and therefore allows better price discrimination. A natural measure of heterogeneity is variance, and the distributions for both parsimonious buyers and high-spenders have equal variances. Yet, for parsimonious advertisers, pure bundling is the optimal strategy for a larger region defined by q N and q P , and for high-spenders, mixed bundling is the optimal strategy for a larger region. This comparison of Figures 7 (a) and 7 (d) thus
demonstrates that the skewness of the efficiency distribution, besides its heterogeneity, seems to affect the benefits of mixed bundling.
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Conclusions
In this paper, we have examined bundling strategies when products are vertically differentiated and the underlying resource capacities are limited. While this research is motivated by an application from the retail industry, the institutional characteristics of television advertising and several other
situations are similar. We analyze both the situation when the quality ratings of the products are subadditive and when they are superadditive. Our results show that the relative availabilities of the resources and the subadditivity of the ratings strongly influence the seller's optimal strategy of implementing full spectrum mixed bundling (offering the bundle and each of the components), or partial spectrum mixed bundling (offering the bundle with one of the components), or not using bundling at all.
When the ratings are superadditive, the full spectrum mixed bundling and the pure components strategies are never optimal. These results differ from those in the extant bundling literature which has not considered either vertical differentiation or limited capacities. We also investigate how introducing horizontal differentiation affects the optimal strategies. In particular, we find that increased horizontal differentiation has an effect similar to reduced subadditivity, and thus the propensity to use the first-best solution of pure bundling increases with increasing horizontal differentiation. Finally, we examine the robustness of our analytical conclusions to more general distributions of buyers using numerical testing, and find that the propensity for various bundling strategies is influenced not only by the heterogeneity of customer preferences, but also by the skewness of this distribution.
Our research points towards several promising research directions. First, we have assumed a monopolistic environment with only one seller. Introducing competition, where buyers desiring to purchase, say, the premium product have a choice of multiple sellers, adds interesting nuances. There is current literature (Economides, 1993; Kopalle, Krishna and Assuncao, 1999; Matutes and Regibeau, 1992 ) that has studied bundling in the presence of competition. However, this research assumes complementary products, not a vertically differentiated market; and this literature does not account for scarce resources. The previous work does not obtain the full range of bundling strategies that we derive.
It would be interesting to study how the range of strategies manifests itself when the resources are limited in a competitive sellers' market. Second, incorporating additional objectives of the buyer into the bundling framework also promises to be interesting and challenging. appropriate for the applications we have cited, it may be useful to also investigate situations in which the components each require an idiosyncratic resource and a second resource common to the components and perhaps the bundle. 17 These and other nuances associated with bundling, as well as the challenge in modeling and analyzing bundling situations and its inter-disciplinary appeal, will in all likelihood guarantee that bundling will continue to be a fertile research area.
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Proof of Proposition 1 and Corollary 2:
The necessary first order conditions on the unconstrained total revenue function (1) yield 
We can write the optimality conditions listed above as:
We ignore the trivial solution T* = T** = T*** = 1 to this system of equations. T** = T*** is a global maximum, the optimal strategy is pure bundling, the optimal bundle price is T*, and the optimal revenue is * [1
Using Markov's inequality, we can find an upper bound on the optimal revenue as follows: 
The thresholds satisfy 0 < T*** < T** < T* < 1. Therefore, for example, the last inequality is equivalent to
The bundle is not offered when equality holds, therefore condition (a) above follows. Conditions 
The optimal prices for PC case, as well as for the other strategies given below, follow similarly. 
STRATEGY O PTIMAL PRICES
MBN
Proof of Proposition 6:
The proof relies on the first order conditions and solving for the Lagrange multipliers.
Proof of Proposition 7:
Using the notation of Figure 4 , the thresholds can be expressed as follows: , a n d ( ) ( ) Differentiating these expressions with respect to  yields part (iii). 
